

(Really - JFK's view on Vietnam threat)

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He believes you should expect to the point of London that our general war response will come only if we or our allies are subjected to major threat. <sup>otherwise</sup> document may seem threatening or belligerent if any part of it should leak at any time.

relatively small nuclear forces deter enemies by ensuring that possession will be fully targeted [but US forces on territory anyway] and may invite a first-strike attack. <sup>[only if US remains constant]</sup> (wants to leave French in no doubt as to reasons for our move). [Valid points of threat of as "insurance" against US]  
importance of forces capable of discouraging bluffs of saboteurs, <sup>[territory]</sup> still out impracticability of using immediate general war as a response to such tactics.

[Point out: Europe not only depends on US now for deterrence; but can't buy a cheap substitute for US deterrence. Small, vulnerable forces would be poor "insurance" against US withdrawal; and a disastrous buy

if it promoted US withdrawal. as Pres + McV  
have threatened it would; because we won't  
remain committed to back up independent nuclear actions  
or threats. ] 6

[How does commitment of Polaris to SACEDOR affect  
use of Polaris for reserves?]

See: Fitch letter to ~~WAC~~ NAC, Apr 26 1961

Rmk to NAC, 8 Aug.

Convince Europe that they cannot buy a trigger  
on a US first strike; (we would withdraw commitment  
first); and we will not <sup>(against US)</sup> let them buy a trigger on a  
SU first strike (US second strike (and if they acquire  
hence we will lessen US association).

Don't support SU belief that US may not  
retaliate; detourer rests on that plan, on SU  
assumption of US/NATO invulnerability. Separately,  
US - veto-free European world. (1) reduces SU confidence in  
US response, and (2) actually reduces to us, just as national forces



The US nuclear weapons program is an all-out effort to provide for the nuclear protection of the Alliance.

In the event of general nuclear war, [U.S.] forces based outside of Europe would be needed.

Through the mid-1960's there can be little question about the ability of the Alliance to maintain nuclear superiority.

During the coming financial years the US plans to spend about \$15.5 bn on its nuclear weapons to assume such superiority.